Monday morning, Dr. Telhas T’zee Yasharmouta al-Feekah, Chief Policy Attaché Without Portfolio at the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, arrived at my office for a consultation. The discussion scheduled was supposed to be about restructuring Iraqi petroleum policy, but as he morosely settled into the tastefully upholstered chair in front of my desk, it was glaringly apparent he had something else much more pressing on his mind.
“In two hours,” he informed me, “my government will announce that our forces have captured Ramadi.”
“Gee whiz, your Excellency,” I observed, “you certainly don’t seem to be very happy about it.”
“I’m not,” he sadly confessed while slowly shaking his head.
“My goodness,” I pressed. “In a situation such as this, congratulations would seem to be in order. Instead, you look as though you were about to receive a root canal.”
“Actually,” he recalled with a wince, “I have, in fact, had a root canal, and this is worse.”
“Well,” I replied, attempting to console him, “it’s got to be better than last May, when ISIS routed the Iraqi Army, occupied Ramadi and took over two billion dollars worth of military equipment the United States had given to Iraq – right?”
“No,” he muttered, “in fact, it’s far worse than that.”
“Are you telling me,” I inquired, “that Iraqi troops marching triumphantly into the city is worse than an ignominious defeat guaranteed, if I dare say, sir, to be remembered by history as an embarrassing example of military incompetence surpassing even the French debacle at Dien Bien Phu?”
“Yes. It is, unfortunately,” he softly wailed, “worse.”
“Worse,” I insisted, “than such acts of monumental cowardice as those committed by the Iraqi Army, so heavily armored and vastly outnumbering ISIS as it was last May; nevertheless soiling their pants in abject fear, and fleeing pell mell from the battlefield in a manner so disorganized and pathetic as to make the Italians’ retreat before Patton appear positively heroic by comparison?”
“Indeed,” he grimly affirmed. “Today is worse.”
“But how, your Excellency?” I beseeched. “What on earth could make you say such a thing?”
My guest solemnly contemplated the ceiling for a long moment. “What is this saying you Americans have about the dog that chases cars?”
“That? Well,” I said, choosing my words carefully, “we say that if the dog ever caught one, it would be um… his undoing.”
“Yes,” he agreed. “That is what is says – that the [expletive] dog who [expletive] catches the [expletive] car and gets [expletive]-up beyond recognition! And now, because your President Obama wanted it, Iraq has caught the [expletive] car!”
“I take it then,” I sought to confirm, “that you perceive the capture of Ramadi as… problematic?”
“Problematic?” he contemptuously spat. “My compliments on your extremely diplomatic language, Mr. Collins! Do you know what your President Obama wants us to do next? Can you guess?”
“Take Mosul?” I ventured.
“Damn good guess, Mr. Collins!” he thundered. “As a matter of fact, later today, Prime Minister al-Abadi will make a speech announcing exactly that!”
“Why, how very… brave of the Iraqi government, your Excellency,” I lauded. “This is a great time for the Iraqi people and I’m sure you must be exceedingly proud of their truly remarkable…”
“He will be delivering a speech written for him over there!” Dr. al-Feekah angrily interrupted, extending his arm and jabbing his index finger toward the White House, visible through the picture window behind the couch. “A speech promising complete and total victory over Daesh in 2016! Do you think Prime Minister al-Abadi would write such a speech, make such promises? No, he would not! Furthermore, Mr. Collins, not even the generals in your Pentagon would try to make him say that! Only that man over there in his mighty Oval Office, only he and his deluded cronies at your State Department would entertain such utterly demented fantasies!”
“Perhaps,” I admitted, “the idea of taking Mosul and ejecting ISIS from Iraq before 2017 might be characterized as somewhat… overly optimistic, but…”
“Overly optimistic?” he interjected with a tone of vehement sarcasm. “It is absolutely insane, that’s what it is!”
“That’s a rather… extreme characterization of the policy,” I shot back, “don’t you think?”
“No, I do not!” he stridently disagreed. “Insane is the entirely appropriate word for it! What is it, Collins, do you want more evidence that Obama and his foreign policy team are ready for the funny farm, the nuthouse, the rubber rooms of the looney bin? All right, I’ll give it to you!”
With that, al-Feekah snapped open his attaché case and withdrew a piece of paper, from which he began to read. “’The conflict in Syria has continued to unfold in tragic ways over the course of 2015. From the humanitarian crisis endured by refugees fleeing violence, to the reprehensible human rights violations and violence carried out by the Asad regime, the Syrian people have borne a heavy load. The United States and many members of the international community have stepped up to aid the Syrian people during their time of need – the United States has led the world in humanitarian aid contributions since the crisis began in 2011. Led by Secretary Kerry, the United States also continues to push for a political transition in Syria, and under his stewardship, in December, the UN Security Council passed a U.S.-sponsored resolution that puts forward a roadmap that will facilitate a transition within Syria to a credible, inclusive, nonsectarian government that is responsive to the needs of the Syrian people.’ Do you know where this comes from, Mr. Collins? It comes from the US State Department’s Web log! And do you know what the title of that passage is? ‘Bringing Peace and Security to Syria.’ No, I am not making that up, Mr. Collins – your Mr. Kerry thinks the United States brought peace and security to Syria in 2015! Now, I ask you, if this is not proof of complete detachment from reality, what else could be?”
“Well,” I conceded, “it does seem a bit… Panglossian, but…”
“Panglossian!” he exploded, waving his arms and gesticulating in a direction eastward, down Pennsylvania Avenue. “It seems your talents are wasted being a policy consultant, Mr. Collins! You obviously should be the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs over there at Foggy Bottom!”
“It doesn’t pay enough,” I informed him.
“No,” he huffed, “given your rates, I suppose it doesn’t.”
“Look,” I commiserated, “I’m really sorry you’re so displeased with the current situation in your country. How can I be of assistance?”
“All right,” he fumed, “first explain to me what is supposed to happen next in Ramadi. Sure – you Americans send in air strikes and blow things up all over the place so ISIS runs away and hides from the the explosions. Then the Iraqi troops move in and occupy the city – or parts of it, anyway. Okay then, as I said, with the aid of Obama’s navy and air force, the dog has caught the car. Now what? Are the Iraqi troops in Ramadi expected to hold it against ISIS when they come back and infiltrate the civilian population? Are we supposed to fight a guerrilla war of attrition with ISIS while simultaneously mounting an offensive against Mosul? What can Obama’s aircraft, drones and cruise missiles do to support the Iraqi forces in Ramadi now, anyway?”
“Additional air support will be made available as needed,” I surmised. “Various areas held by ISIS can be subjected to surgical strikes.”
“But how,” he countered, “can Iraq possibly be expected to rebuild the infrastructure and economy of Ramadi in a situation like that?”
“You have to realize, your Excellency,” I cautioned, “that it may be necessary to destroy the city in order to save it.”
“Did you hear what you just said?” he exclaimed. “What kind of strategy is that?”
“It’s the same one we used in Vietnam,” I explained. “The Mekong Delta is littered with the remains of villages and hamlets that were destroyed in order to save them from Communism. Destroying Ramadi in order to save it would simply be an extension of the same solution to a larger, urban context.”
“But if there’s no city of Ramadi,” he objected, “what will the Army of Iraq use as a staging position for an invasion of Mosul?”
“Well,” I pointed out, “you don’t really need the city, do you? All that’s needed is the strategic position where Ramadi happens to be located.”
“You’re as crazy as Obama and Kerry!” he accused.
“No, now wait a minute here,” I clarified. “I’m not saying I agree with this stuff, I’m just attempting to explain to you how American foreign policy experts think.”
“So you’re saying you think they want Iraq to turn Ramadi into a big military base to use for an assault on Mosul?” he asked.
“Essentially,” I confirmed.
“And destroy Ramadi and Mosul in the process?” he indignantly demanded. “Regardless of the consequences for the Iraqis who live there?”
“If necessary,” I responded, “yes. If you Iraqis can figure out how to deal with ISIS on the ground without having the United States bomb Ramadi and Mosul back into the stone age, that would be nice, of course. But if you can’t, well, then, no more Ramadi and no more Mosul.”
“And what if al-Abadi tells the United States to stop bombing Ramadi and Mosul back into the stone age?” he wondered.
“Then somebody else will soon be Prime Minister of Iraq,” I predicted. “The people of your country have to implement the processes of democracy and the principles of freedom. They must abandon tribal divisions and eschew religious and cultural sectarianism, instituting and maintaining tolerance, equality and justice, living forever thereafter in peace as citizens of a prosperous member of the post-modern international community. And if the United States of America has to bomb the living snot out of them to accomplish that, then we will, because we’re doing it for their own good, and we are absolutely certain that later, they will thank us for it.”
“I see,” al-Feekah sighed. “But I cannot help thinking, that if Iraq had maybe eighteen months to pacify Ramadi, consolidate, build and train the Army of Iraq, and obtain more materiel, then move on Mosul…”
“And after another eighteen months or so,” I extrapolated, “use Ramadi and Mosul as platforms from which to mount an offensive to completely remove ISIS from Iraq…”
“Yes, yes,” he effused, “wouldn’t that make much more sense? Why do we only have twelve months?”
“Not twelve,” I corrected. “Nine. Obama requires complete and total victory over ISIS in Iraq by September 28, 2016.”
“But… but… how,” he stammered, “can you know that so precisely?”
“Because,” I revealed, “six weeks is the ideal time interval for the incumbent party to announce a great foreign policy victory prior to Election Day.”
“So you’re telling me that Ramadi and Mosul and the rest of ISIS-occupied Iraq must suffer horribly so Hillary Clinton can follow Barack Obama into the White House?” he lamented.
“Would Iraq rather deal with Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio or… Donald Trump instead?” I asked.
Dr. al-Feekah bowed his head and began to weep. “I… I… I guess not,” he bawled.
“Cheer up,” I advised, “you might get lucky and end up with Bernie Sanders.”
At that, my forlorn client raised his head, and gazed as me with tears running down his face. “But this Bernie Sanders… he is a Jew, is he not?”
“Oh, yes, well, there is that,” I agreed. “If that’s a problem, then I suppose you Iraqis had better pray for Hillary to win the Democratic nomination.”
“In sha Allah,” he softly sobbed, “in sha Allah.”