Very early this morning, I had to go in to the office for an urgent emergency visit with Dr. Bedi Fawitiri bin Tizik, Special Envoy of the Arab League. He was in a state of high agitation and consternation as he threw himself onto the couch by the picture window, tossing his attaché case down on the cushion next to him.
“Mr. Collins,” he sighed, “I can’t begin to tell you how disappointed the Arab League has become with the al-Assad regime in Syria.”
“I can well imagine, however,” I replied. “I hear President Assad’s troops have taken to shooting in the general direction of the Arab League observers.”
“Under such circumstances,” bin Tizik declared, “the League had no choice. The level of violence between the armed opposition and loyalist military has become… unbearable, to say the least. Heavily armed Syrian army and militia units are moving in on rebel strongholds at Jabal al Zawiya, Dayr az-Zawr and Az Zabadani. Homs has become a divided city, with constant gunfire and artillery, day and night. The rebels have taken over the suburbs of Damascus. It’s like a war zone out there.”
“Who’d have thought it?” I asked, rhetorically.
“The facts on the ground are obvious,” bin Tizik tutted, “It’s much, much too dangerous for Arab League troops. Somebody might get killed. The League had no alternative but to order Lieutenant General Mohammad Ahmad al-Dabi to take all appropriate actions for the protection of our observers; and, of course, the League must bring the situation in Syria to the attention of the UN Security Council. Our Secretary-General, Nabil el-Araby, will be briefing them on the crisis tomorrow.”
“And he will suggest,” I sought to confirm, “that the Security Council take all necessary steps to ensure that President Bashar al-Assad steps down?”
“That,” bin Tizik assured me, “is exactly what the League has in mind.”
“And we both know,” I dryly observed, “that Russia and China, who are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, are going to veto any proposal that President al-Assad leave his post.”
“Ah, yes,” bin Tizik shrugged, “an inconvenient truth, to be sure.”
“So, bottom line,” I concluded, “this Security Council business is just a ploy so your Arab League troops can dig in and hunker down for a week or thereabouts, after which, they will, most likely, leave.”
“Uh, yes,” bin Tizik conceded, “all of that will probably come to pass.”
“And let me guess,” I continued. “You’re concerned that ‘all of that,’ as you put it, might make the Arab League appear in, let us say, a somewhat less than entirely positive light?”
“Um… well, yes,” bin Tizik admitted. “And, before you go any further, let me say, you are correct, what I need from you is some ideas on how to… spin this situation.”
“Very well,” I said, “in that case, let’s get started. First of all, what does the Arab League intend to do while the UN Security Council ponders your recommendation that President Bashar al-Assad quit running Syria and go back to practicing ophthalmology?”
“Ah, well,” bin Tizik stammered, “we… we, uh… we will wait for the Security Council to render its decision, I guess.”
“No,” I advised, “that, you most assuredly should not do. On the contrary, during this interval, the Arab League should be highly proactive.”
“Why?” bin Tizik wondered, striking a puzzled expression.
“Because,” I explained, “doing so will make the Arab League appear to be concerned about Syria.”
“Concerned?” bin Tizik muttered as he slowly turned my proposal over in his mind. “About Syria? Oh… oh, yes, now I get it! Sure! We want the world to know how much we care about Syria, and furthermore, how much we care about what happens to the Syrian people, because… uh… ah… because…”
“Because,” I interjected, “they are your Arab brothers and sisters.”
“Oh, yes, yes, right,” bin Tizik smiled as he finally apprehended my drift. “And we love and care about them very much!”
“Of course you do,” I agreed. “So while the UN Security Council debates what, if anything, it shall do about the ongoing slaughter of innocents by the Syrian government, the Arab League should be offering helpful ideas pertaining to the solution.”
“I see, I see,” bin Tizik nodded enthusiastically. “Yes, definitely, we should be offering… ah… ideas. Good ideas. Positive ideas. Important… ideas.” He hesitated, throwing me an imploring glance.
“Such as a suitable exit strategy for Dr. al-Assad,” I volunteered.
“Okay,” bin Tizik acquiesced, “but it can’t be one the Americans like, because then the people of the nations in the Arab League would disapprove of it.”
“Fortunately,” I noted, “the United States has not said much in particular about the departure of President al-Assad, beyond stating that the US believes it to be in the best interests of all concerned.”
“So,” bin Tizik fretted, “there would be no danger of the United States of America offering President al-Assad its… hospitality, would there?”
“Not at all likely,” I assessed.
“How about China, then?” bin Tizik fretted.
“Even if they did,” I opined, “there’s no way a person such as Dr. Bashar al-Assad would ever take them up on it. He knows that, in China, he would be nothing more than a fallen foreign potentate of a client state and under constant house arrest. On the other hand, Russia might prove more… welcoming.”
“But exile in Russia,” bin Tizik worried, “while being something of which the majority of the Arab world’s people would approve, would not be an outcome the leaders of its various nations would necessarily wish to see.”
“Understandable,” I told him, “given Russia’s… ah… historical interest in the Arab world in general and the Middle East in particular. The Chinese, on the other hand, just see the whole region as a place randomly endowed with huge petroleum deposits which is populated by tall, malodorous barbarians endowed with particularly large noses and correspondingly small genitals. Ahem… no offense – present company excepted, of course.”
“Having had some experience dealing with them,” bin Tizik sniffed, “I am well aware of what the Chinese think of us. But be that as it may, what does the Arab League say to discourage Russia from rolling out the red carpet for Dr. al-Assad?”
“You should issue statements,” I recommended, “which imply he would pose a threat to the entrenched oligarchy. The beautiful part of that strategy is, you don’t have to get all of them to believe it – if you only manage to get two or three of them worked up into a xenophobic fit, that will do the trick. Better yet, link al-Assad to Chechnya and the Russians will never let him in the country.”
“What,” bin Tizik asked, “if the French offer to take him?”
“Good question,” I remarked. “If the Americans are too emphatic about saying they wouldn’t touch him with a ten foot pole, the French might do just that in order flip Uncle Sam the bird – it’s sort of a gut reflex of theirs. In fact, they’ve been doing it for so long, and they do it so often, I’m not even sure they’re aware of it every time it happens. But al-Assad would have to be insane to take the French government up on such an offer.”
“Why is that?” bin Tizik inquired.
“Because,” I cautioned, “French right-wing anti-Arab elements would be out to liquidate him at the very first opportunity. The same thing goes for Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Austria – as a matter of fact, it goes for just about any country in Western Europe these days, with a couple of rare exceptions. Anywhere in Europe, his security budget would be enormous; and in most countries, his odds long and his days short, too. But tell me, isn’t there a member of the Arab League that would consider offering al-Assad a new home?”
Dr. bin Tizik wrinkled his brow in fevered concentration for several minutes as he considered my query. “No,” he finally spoke, “I don’t think so.”
“Oh, come now,” I chided, “didn’t Saudi Arabia take in Idi Amin? Certainly, if the Saudis could do that…”
“Yes,” bin Tizik interrupted, “but Bashar al-Assad is no Idi Amin.”
“How so?” I asked.
“Idi Amin was a fellow Sunni,” bin Tizik shrugged. “No problem. But Bashar al-Assad is an Alawite.”
“And that,” I responded, a bit taken aback, “is an issue? Is it because Alawites are a sect of Shia Islam, then? In that case, couldn’t the League propose a plan for him to go into exile in Iraq? There are plenty of Shia in Iraq, after all.”
“The problem with proposing another Arab country,” bin Tizik elaborated, “is not that Alawites are Shia. Actually, most Shia don’t consider Alawites to be Moslems of any sort, and, moreover, throughout the Arab world, Alawites are universally said to be malodorous heretics endowed with particularly large noses and correspondingly small genitals.”
“Well, then,” I extemporized, “how about the Arab League members all getting together and chipping in enough money to set up Bashar al-Assad to live in exile in either Switzerland, Monaco, Costa Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay or the Cayman Islands?”
“Are you recommending,” bin Tizik sought to confirm, “that we propose President al-Assad leave Syria for one of those countries?”
“If you can work out a plan with one of their governments,” I carefully qualified, “and, as I implied, promise to provide him with a sufficiently large golden parachute. Besides, it’s not like it’s terribly probable the Arab League will have to put up the jack to follow through, anyway. Odds are, if al-Assad relinquishes power, he’ll never get out of Syria. So the Arab League can definitely afford to make very, very generous proposals. He won’t accept any of them, anyway. Meanwhile, during the UN Security Council debate, the Arab League can look extremely good, and with minimal effort and expense, at that. And in the process, the fact that your soldiers all jumped in the nearest fox hole and hid just as soon as some lead began to fly in their direction will be entirely forgotten, which, after all, is the point of the whole exercise, anyway; as you said – spin.”
“Okay,” bin Tizik concurred as he took out his iPhone, “let’s get started then. Can you work up an initial estimate of how much all of this might cost while I pitch it to Secretary-General el-Araby?”
“Certainly,” I assured him, “my pleasure.”